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The principal and overriding aim of the system set up by the 
European Convention on Human Rights is to bring about a 
situation in which in each and every Contracting State the right and 
freedoms are effectively protected, that is primarily that the 
relevant structures and procedures are in place to allow individual 
citizens to vindicate those rights and to assert those freedoms in the 
national courts. This the first level at which Convention protection 
should operate, but it is not the only one. The quantum leap 
achieved by the Convention was the recognition of the individual 
as a subject of international law and the offering of international 
protection to individuals. At the heart of this system are the notions 
of human dignity, of democracy and the rule of law. These aims 
come together in that it is through individual applications that 
structural or systemic weaknesses are identified. 
The Convention system is a subsidiary one: it falls firstly to the 
national authorities to secure the protection sought. This is why the 
Convention has a strong procedural bias. Clearly this is the case for 
the due process provisions which are essentially aimed at securing 
procedural safeguards in relation to detention and the conduct of 
judicial proceedings under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. 
However, it is also true of the other substantive provisions of the 
Convention. In a number of cases206 involving alleged breaches of 
205 Dr. Wildhaber is the President of the European Court of Human Rights. 
206 Kaya v. Turkey, 19.2.1998, Reports 1998-1, p. 329, § 105; Tanrikulu v. Turkey, 8.7.2000, 
§ 101.
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the right to life guaranteed by Article 2 of the Convention where it 
has been unable to establish to the required standard of proof the 
substantive violation, the Court has found a "procedural" violation 
on account of the lack of an effective investigation or effective 
judicial proceedings at national level capable of establishing the 
true facts at the origin of the allegation. The Court has also held207 
that where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has 
suffered treatment infringing Article 3 (which prohibits torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment) at the hands of the police or other 
similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with 
the State's general duty under Article 1 of the Convention, likewise 
requires by implication that there should be an effective official 
investigation. As with the duty to carry out an investigation under 
Article 2, such investigation should be capable of leading to the 
identification and punishment of those responsible. 
In the context of Article 8 the Court will have regard to whether 
there are adequate procedural safeguards in place to protect the 
Article 8 interest
208
• In the recent case of P ., C. and S v. the United 
Kingdom involving the removal into care of a baby shortly after 
birth and where the parents were not legally represented either in 
the care proceedings or the subsequent freeing for adoption 
proceedings, the Court stressed the importance of the procedural 
obligations inherent in Article 8209 . In these difficult and sensitive 
cases it is often hardly possible for the Court to make an 
assessment of the substantive issues before the national courts, for 
instance whether or not the care decision was justified. It can 
however consider whether the parents were properly involved in 
the decision-making process to a degree sufficient to provide them 
with the requisite protection of their interests under Article 8 of the 
Convention. This approach is entirely consistent with the Court's 
longstanding jurisprudence that it is not to be seen as a "fourth 
instance", in other words that it does not rehear cases as to their 
facts and law on appeal, as it were, from national courts. It is, as 
207 See for example, Assenov v. Bulgaria, 28.10.1998, Reports 1998-VIII, p. 3290, § 102; 
Labita v. Italy, 6.4.2000, § 131; Veznedaroglu v. Turkey, 11.4.2000, §32. 
208 Chapman v. the United Kingdom, 18.1.2001, ECHR 2001, § 114. 
209 P., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom, 16.7.2002. 
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has been frequently pointed out, not a court of last instance, but a 
court of last resort. 
It follows that practically all the Convention guarantees contain at 
least an implied positive obligation to set up and render effective 
procedures making it possible to vindicate the right concerned at 
national level. This is of course confirmed by the requirement of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 3 5 of the 
Convention and the obligation to afford an effective remedy under 
Article 13. This must indeed be so if the system is to function as a 
subsidiary one. As the Court has recently emphasised, "the object 
and purpose underlying the Convention, as set out in Article 1, is 
that the rights and freedoms should be secured by the Contracting 
State within its jurisdiction. It is fundamental to the machinery of 
protection established by the Convention that the national systems 
themselves provide redress for breaches of its provisions, the Court 
exerting its supervisory role subject to the principle of 
"subsidiarity"210. This was confirmed in the context of Article 13 
when the Court held that the obligation to provide a remedy 
extended also to problems of length of proceedings in breach of 
Article 6. As the Court noted in the case of Kudla v. Poland, "the 
rule in Article 3 5 § 1 is based on the assumption, reflected in 
Article 13 (with which it has a close affinity), that there is an 
effective domestic remedy available in respect of the alleged 
breach of an individual's Convention rights. In that way, Article 
13, giving direct expression to the States' obligation to protect 
human rights first and foremost within their own legal system, 
establishes an additional guarantee for an individual in order to 
ensure that he or she effectively enjoys those rights. The object of 
Article 13, as emerges from the travaux preparatoires211 , is to 
provide a means whereby individuals can obtain relief at national 
level for violations of their Convention rights before having to set 
in motion the international machinery of complaint before the 
Court"212• 
210 Z. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 10.5.2001, ECHR 2001-V, § 103.
211 See the Collected Edition of the "Travaux Preparatoires" of the European Convention on
Human Rights, vol. II, pp. 485 and 490, and vol. III, p. 651. 
212 Kudla v. Poland, 26.10.2000, ECHR 2000-XI, § 152. 
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This must work both ways. In other words, where there are no or 
insufficient procedural safeguards protecting the right in question, 
there may well be a violation of the right in both its substantive and 
procedural aspects and of Article 13. On the other hand, where 
such safeguards are in place a significant part of the Contracting 
State's obligations has been fulfilled. That does not mean that the 
Court in exercising its supervisory review is precluded from 
finding a violation, since, clearly, substantive issues will also arise, 
but it does make it possible for that review to be carried out from 
the right distance, from the right perspective. If in addition the 
national authorities are in a position to apply Convention case-law 
to the questions before it, then much, if not all, of the Strasbourg 
Court's work is done. This is ultimately, as I have said, the 
objective underlying the system: to ensure that individual citizens 
throughout the Convention community are able fully to assert their 
Convention rights within their own domestic legal system. 
Another way of putting this is that fulfilment of the procedural 
obligation leaves room for the operation of what we call the margin 
of appreciation. This area of discretion is a necessary element 
inherent in the nature of international jurisdiction when applied to 
democratic States that respect the rule of law. It reflects on the one 
hand the practical matter of the proximity to events of national 
authorities and the sheer physical impossibility for an international 
court, whose jurisdiction covers 44 States with a population of 
some 800 million inhabitants, to operate as a tribunal of fact. The 
Court has observed that it must be cautious in taking on the role of 
first instance tribunal of fact. Nor is it, as we have seen under the 
"fourth instance" doctrine, the Court's task to substitute its own 
assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts. Though the 
Court is not bound by the findings of domestic courts, it requires 
cogent findings of fact to depart from findings of fact reached by 
those courts213• 
But the margin of appreciation also embraces an element of 
deference to decisions taken by democratic institutions, a deference 
213 Tanli v. Turkey, 10.4.2001, at§ 110. 
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deriving from the primordial place of democracy within the 
Convention system. It is thus not the role of the European Court 
systematically to second-guess democratic legislatures. What it has 
to do is to exercise an international supervision in specific cases to 
ensure that the solutions found do not impose an excessive or 
unacceptable burden on one sector of society or individuals. The 
democratically elected legislature must be free to take measures in 
the general interest even where they interfere with a given category 
of individual interests. The balancing exercise between such 
competing interests is most appropriately carried out by the 
national authorities. There must however be a balancing exercise, 
and this implies the existence of procedures which make such an 
exercise possible. Moreover the result must be that the measure taken 
in the general interest bears a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality both to the aim pursued and the effect on the 
individual interest concerned. In that sense the area of discretion 
accorded to States, the margin of appreciation, will never be 
unlimited and the rights of individuals will ultimately be protected 
against the excesses of majority rule. The margin of appreciation 
recognises that where appropriate procedures are in place a range of 
solutions compatible with human rights may be available to the 
national authorities. The Convention does not purport to impose 
uniform approaches to the myriad different interests which arise in 
the broad field of fundamental rights protection; it seeks to establish 
common minimum standards to provide a Europe-wide framework 
for domestic human rights protection. 
The search for a balance between competing interests may be 
relevant even to the due process guarantees. Thus for instance in 
respect of detention there may be a conflict between an individual's 
right to procedural guarantees and ultimately his or her freedom 
and the need to protect the community at large. The Court has 
found that in connection with the lawful detention of persons of 
unsound mind under Article 5 § 1 ( e) the "interests of the 
protection of the public" may "prevail over the individual's right to 
liberty to the extent justifying an emergency confinement in the 
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absence of the usual guarantees"214• Again it has accepted, in the 
context of Article 5 of the Convention aimed at prohibiting arbitrary 
detention, that the Contracting States cannot be asked to establish the 
reasonableness of the suspicion grounding an arrest of a suspected 
terrorist by disclosing the confidential sources of supporting 
information or even facts which would be susceptible of indicating 
such sources or their identit/ 15 • Liberty even in its narrowest sense is 
subject to the constraints of living in and protecting society. Taking 
another example, the right to a court, which the Court has read into 
the Article 6 fair trial guarantee in a pure exercise of rule of law 
logic, is not absolute216• It may be subject to legitimate restrictions, 
such as statutory limitation periods, security for costs orders, 
regulations concerning minors and persons of unsound mind. 
Where the individual's access is limited either by operation of law 
or in fact, the Court will examine whether the limitation imposed 
impaired the essence of the right and in particular whether it 
pursued a legitimate aim and there was a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be achieved217 • In other words there is a need to strike a balance 
between public policy interests militating in favour of any such 
restriction and the individual's access to a court which may be 
frustrated thereby. 
Freedoms such as those of expression and association are subject to 
express restrictions in so far as such restrictions are necessary in a 
democratic society. In connection with the freedom of association 
under Article 11 of the Convention, in the case of Refah Partisi 
and Others v. Turkey2 18 a Chamber of the Court concluded that the 
grounds cited by the Turkish Constitutional Court to justify the 
dissolution of Refah, an Islamic party, were relevant and sufficient 
and that the interference complained of was necessary in a democratic 
society. Ref ah had, so the Court found, declared their intention of 
214 Xv the United Kingdom, 5.11.1980, Series A no. 46, § 45. 
215 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30.8.1990, Series A no. 182, §§ 32 
and 34. 
216 Golder v.the United Kingdom, 21.2.1975, Series A no. 18, § 35. 
217 Zand Others v. the United Kingdom, 10.5.2001, ECHR 2001-V, § 93. 
218 Judgment of 31.8.2001. 
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setting up a plurality of legal systems and introducing Islamic law 
(the sharia) and had adopted an ambiguous stance with regard to the 
use of force to gain power and retain it. The majority in the seven­
Judge Chamber was 4-3. The dissent within the Chamber was, 
however, based more on the strength of the evidence that Refah's 
aims were anti-democratic, than any disagreement about the general 
principles applicable. These were in particular that there can be no 
democracy where the people of a State, even by a majority decision, 
waive their legislative and judicial powers in favour of an entity 
which is not responsible to the people it governs, whether it is secular 
or religious and that, as it is a function of written law to establish 
distinctions on the basis of relevant differences, the rule of law cannot 
be sustained over a long period of time if persons governed by the 
same laws do not have the last word on the subject of their content 
and implementation. 
The Court accepted that a political party might campaign for a change 
in the law or the legal and constitutional basis of the State on two 
conditions: first that the means used to that end must in every respect 
be legal and democratic and, second, that the change proposed must 
itself be compatible with fundamental democratic principles. It 
followed that a party whose leaders incited recourse to violence or 
proposed a policy that did not comply with one or more of the rules 
of democracy or was aimed at the destruction of democracy and at 
infringement of the rights and freedoms granted under democracy 
could not lay claim to the protection of the Convention. The case is 
now pending before the Court's Grand Chamber of seventeen Judges 
and we must wait for its judgment to see whether the Chamber's 
ruling is confirmed. 
If one of the main roles of human rights law is to maintain balance 
in a democratic society, that clearly includes striking the right 
balance between, on the one hand, appropriate measures to protect 
democratic society against genuine threats and, on the other, 
disproportionate repression. The current debate on terrorism 
focuses on this problem. Terrorism, as indeed violence in general, 
raises two fundamental issues which human rights law must 
address. Firstly, it strikes directly at democracy and the rule of law, 
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the two central pillars of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. It must therefore be possible for democratic States 
governed by the rule of law to protect themselves effectively 
against terrorism; human rights law must be able to accommodate 
this need. The European Convention should not be applied in such 
a way as to prevent States from taking reasonable and 
proportionate action to defend democracy and the rule of law. 
Moreover, as the European Court of Human Rights has held, 
Convention States have a duty under Article 2 of the Convention to 
take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their 
jurisdiction219 • Some compromise may then be necessary, as the 
Court has recognised, between the requirements for defending 
democratic society and individual rights220 • It would run counter to 
the fundamental object and purpose of the Convention, for national 
authorities to be prevented from making a proportionate response to 
such threats in the interests of safety of the community as a whole. 
But the second way in which terrorism and violence challenge 
democracy and human rights law is by inciting States to take 
repressive measures, thereby insidiously undermining the 
foundations of democratic society. Our response to terrorism has 
accordingly to strike a balance between the need to take protective 
measures and the need to preserve those rights and freedoms 
without which there is no democracy. At the same time and from a 
wider perspective, it is precisely situations in which there is a lack 
of respect for human dignity, a lack of effective human rights 
protection, which breed terrorism. Efforts to prevent the spread of 
international terrorism should therefore embrace the aims of 
international human rights law. Limitations must moreover never be 
so broad as to impair the very essence of the right in question; they 
must, in Strasbourg terms, also pursue a legitimate aim and bear a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aims sought to be achieved. Looking at the 
question of balance in this context one needs to ask whether there are 
219 See most recently, Pretty v the United Kingdom, 29.4.2002, ECHR-2002, § 38. 
22° Klass and Others v. Germany, see note 3 above,§ 59. 
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techniques which can be employed which accommodate legitimate 
security concerns and yet accord the individual a substantial 
measure of procedural justice
221
• It should not in any event be
possible for the national authorities to free themselves from 
effective control by the domestic courts, or ultimately international 
jurisdiction, simply by asserting that national security and terrorism 
are involved. As the Court has recently confirmed in AI-Nashif v. 
Bulgaria, "even where national security is at stake, the concepts of 
lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic society require that 
measures affecting fundamental rights must be subject to some 
form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body 
competent to review the reasons for the decision and relevant 
evidence"
222
• An individual must be able to challenge the 
executive's assertion that national authority is at stake223. On the 
other hand, the Convention should not be applied in such a manner 
as to put disproportionate difficulties in the way of the police 
authorities of the Contracting States in taking effective measures to 
counter organised terrorism224• 
One well-known principle of the Strasbourg case-law is that the 
European Convention on Human Rights is a "living instrument", 
that is to say that it is interpreted "in the light of present day 
conditions", that it evolves, through the interpretation of the 
European Court of Human Rights ( and formerly the Commission of 
Human Rights), to take account of changes in social and moral 
attitudes and technological developments. Convention terms have 
not remained frozen in the meaning which might most obviously 
have been attributed to them in 1950; had they done the 
Convention would have lost a part of its relevance. If this principle 
of dynamic interpretation was first enounced in relation to corporal 
punishment following criminal proceedings225, in the Tyrer case, it 
has received its most frequent expression in relation to Article 8. 
This is hardly surprising not only because of the breadth of the 
221 See for example Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15.11.1996, Reports 1996-V, § 131. 
222 Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 20.6.2002, § 123. 
223 Ibid., § 124. 
224 Fox, Campbell and Hartley,v. the United Kingdom, cited above note 3, § 34. 
225 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25.4.1978, Series A no. 26, § 31 
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interests covered by Article 8, that is private and family life, 
correspondence and home, but also because it is precisely those 
interests which are most likely to be affected by changes in society. 
In a dynamic instrument, Article 8 had proved to be the most 
elastic provision. Thus it has embraced such matters as the taking 
of children into care, nuisance caused by a waste treatment plant, 
planning issues, aircraft noise, transsexuals' rights, corporal 
punishment in schools, data protection, access to confidential 
documents relating to an applicant's past in the care of the public 
authorities, the choice of a child's first name, application of 
immigration rules, disclosure of medical records and I could go 
one; the list is a long one. 
The breadth of the potential scope of the interests protected by 
Article 8 has thus been an advantage in allowing the development 
of the Court's case-law in this area to keep pace with the modem 
world. It is, however, something of a disadvantage when 
Governments are seeking to establish exactly what is expected of 
them under the Convention. This is all the more so, because in one 
of its earliest judgments concerning Article 8226 in the famous case 
of Marckx v. Belgium, the Court made it clear that in addition to 
the obligation to abstain from arbitrary interference with the 
protected interests, the State authorities could be under a positive 
obligation to ensure effective "respect" for those interests. In the 
context of that case, which concerned the status of a child born out 
of wedlock, the Court noted that respect for family life implied in 
particular "the existence in domestic law of legal safeguards that 
render possible as from the moment of birth the child's integration 
in his [or her] family". Moreover, such positive obligations may 
involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for 
private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals 
between themselves227 • 
Whether the obligation imposed on the State is primarily negative 
or positive, the right to respect is not absolute. In common with the 
226 Marckx v. Belgium, 13.6.1979, Series A no. 31, § 31. 
227 X and Y v the Netherlands, 26.3.2000, Series A no. 91, § 23. 
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other Articles of the Convention dealing with "the freedoms", 
Articles 9, 10 and 11, the Convention accepts that under paragraph 
8 § 2 restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of these rights. 
Thus, in regard to the negative obligation, in order to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 8 § 2, interference by a public authority 
must be "in accordance with the law", must pursue one of the 
legitimate aims set out in the paragraph and must be "necessary in 
a democratic society". In determining what is necessary in a 
democratic society in this field, as in others, Contracting States 
enjoy a margin of appreciation, or area of discretion, whose 
justification is, as I have suggested, both practical and theoretical. 
As with Articles 9 to 11 of the Convention the margin of 
appreciation will vary according to the context. Thus for example, 
with respect to family life, the Court recognises that national 
authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the 
necessity of taking children into care, but calls for stricter scrutiny 
in respect of any further limitations such as restrictions on parental 
rights and access. As regards respect for the home the Court again 
accepts that national authorities in principle enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation in the implementation of planning decisions. The 
scope of the margin of appreciation depends on such factors as the 
nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the 
individual and the nature of the activities concerned. 
Whether at national level or in Strasbourg, the assessment of 
whether a measure is necessary in a democratic society is 
essentially a question of balancing the individual's interest against 
that of the community. Where what is in issue is the existence of a 
positive obligation, much the same balancing exercise has to be 
carried out. As the Court has pointed out, in determining whether 
or not a positive obligation exists "regard must be had to the fair 
balance that must be struck between the general interest of the 
community and the interests of the individual, the search for which 
balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention.
228 
The Court 
has indeed made clear that the boundaries between the States' 
228 Cossey v. the United Kingdom, 27.9.1990, Series A no. 148, § 37. 
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positive and negative obligations do not always lend themselves to 
precise definition. In both cases regard has to be had to the 
competing interests of the individual and the community as a 
whole, and in both cases the State enjoys a certain margin of 
• • 229 apprec1at1on . 
A line of cases on transsexuals' rights are interesting in that they 
shed light on the evolutive process of interpretation of the 
Convention. The essence of the applicants' complaints has been 
that the respondent States in question have failed to take positive 
steps to modify a system which operates to their detriment, the 
system being that of birth registration. Carrying out its usual 
exercise of seeking a fair balance between the general interest and 
the interests of the individual, the Court had until last year, by a 
small and dwindling majority and with one exception distinguished 
on the facts230, found that there was no positive obligation for the 
respondent State to modify its system of birth registration so as to 
have the register of births updated or annotated to record changed 
sexual identity231 • 
However, the Court never closed the door on the possibility of 
requiring legal recognition of new sexual identity. It has reiterated 
the need for Contracting States to keep the question under review. 
In a case decided in 1998, it acknowledged the increased social 
acceptance of transsexualism and increased recognition of the 
problems which post-operative transsexuals encounter. In order to 
determine whether it should revise its case-law, the Court has 
looked at two aspects: scientific developments and legal 
developments. As to scientific developments, it confirmed its view 
that there remained uncertainty as to the essential nature of 
transsexualism and observed that the legitimacy of surgical 
intervention was sometimes questioned. There had not been any 
findings in the area of medical science which settled conclusively 
229 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 22.4.1997, Reports 1997-II, § 41. 
230 B v. France, 25.3.1992, Series A no 232-C. 
231 Rees v. United Kingdom, 17.10.1986, Series A no. 106; Cossey v. the United Kingdom, 
27.9.1990, Series A no. 184; Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, 30.7.1998, 
Reports 1998-V. 
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the doubts concerning the causes of the condition of 
transsexualism. The non-acceptance by the respondent State of the 
sex of the brain as being the crucial determinant of gender could 
not be criticised as unreasonable232 . 
Looking at the legal development, the Court examined the 
comparative study that had been submitted by a human rights 
organisation. It was not satisfied that this established the existence 
of any common European approach to the problems created by the 
recognition in law of post-operative gender status. In particular 
there was no common approach as to how to address the 
repercussions which such recognition might entail for other areas 
of law such as marriage, filiation, privacy or data protection. 
In the case of Goodwin v. the United Kingdom
233 decided last 
year however, the Court finally reached the conclusion that the fair 
balance now tilted in favour of legal recognition of transsexuals. It 
recalled that it had to have regard to the changing conditions within 
the respondent State and within Contracting States generally and to 
respond to any evolving convergence as to standards to be 
achieved. A failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and 
evolutive approach would risk rendering it a bar to reform or 
improvement. In this case the Court attached less importance to the 
lack of evidence of a common European approach to the resolution 
of the legal and practical problems posed by transsexualism than to 
the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international 
trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of 
transsexuals, but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of 
post-operative transsexuals. No concrete or substantial hardship or 
detriment to the public interest had been demonstrated as likely to 
flow from the changes to the status of transsexuals. Society could 
reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to 
enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in accordance with 
sexual identity chosen by them at great personal cost. 
232 Sheffield and Horsham,§ 55. 
233 Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 11.7.2002. 
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The Court is understandably wary of extending its case-law on 
positive obligations. It has first to be convinced not only that there 
has been a clear evolution of morals, but that this evolution, where 
appropriate substantiated by an accompanying evolution of 
scientific knowledge, is reflected in the law and practice of the 
majority of the Contracting States. The Court will then interpret the 
terms of the Convention in the light of that evolution. It is not, I 
would say, the Court's role to engineer changes in society or to 
impose moral choices. 
Another, rather different example, of the living instrument 
approach can be seen in the case of Stafford v. the United 
Kingdom
234
, where the Court revised its earlier finding that 
mandatory life sentences for murder in the UK constituted 
punishment for life. The applicant had been convicted of murder 
and released on licence after completing the punitive element or 
tariff of his sentence. He was subsequently convicted and 
sentenced for an unconnected, non-violent offence. His continued 
detention after completing the second sentence under the first 
mandatory life sentence was found to be in breach of Article 5 § 1. 
Although the Court found that there was no material distinction on 
the facts between Stafford and the earlier case235, having regard to 
the significant developments in the domestic sphere, it proposed to 
re-assess "in the light of present-day conditions" what was now the 
appropriate interpretation and application of the Convention. This 
was necessary to render the Convention rights practical and 
effective, not theoretical and illusory. Thus the Court had regard to 
the changing conditions and any emerging consensus discernible 
within the domestic legal order of the respondent Contracting State. 
It found that there was not a sufficient causal connection between 
the applicant's continued detention and his original sentence for 
murder. The Court also held that there had been a breach of Article 
5 § 4 in that the power of decision concerning the applicant's 
release lay with a member of the executive, the Home Secretary, 
who could reject the parole board's recommendation. In other 
234 Stafford v. the United Kingdom, 28.5.2002, ECHR 2002-IV. 
235 Wynne v. the United Kingdom, 18.7.1994, Series A no. 294-A. 
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words the lawfulness of the applicant's continued detention was not 
reviewed by a body with a power to order his release or with a 
procedure containing the necessary judicial safeguards. 
The Court drew attention to another aspect namely the separation 
of powers and the difficulty of reconciling the power of a member 
of executive to fix the punitive element of a prison sentence and to 
decide on a prisoner's release with that notion, which had assumed 
a growing importance in the case-law of the Court. In another 
British case, concerning the release of persons detained in a mental 
hospitaI236 the power to order release lay with the Secretary of 
State. The decision to release would therefore be taken by a 
member of the executive and not by the competent tribunal. This 
was not a matter of form but impinged on the fundamental 
principle of separation of powers and detracted from a necessary 
guarantee against the possibility of abuse. 
The question of the separation of powers or more specifically the 
independence of the judiciary has arisen in other contexts. Last 
year the Court found a violation of the fair trial guarantee in the 
Ukrainian case of Sovtransavto Holding in which there had been 
in the domestic proceedings numerous interventions of the 
Ukrainian authorities at the highest level. Such interventions 
disclosed a lack of respect for the very function of the judiciary237• 
The Strasbourg Court has itself had on occasion to remind 
Governments of the special character of its judicial function, which 
should command the same respect owed to a national judiciary and 
to which the doctrine of the separation of powers also applies 
mutatis mutandis. 
Another recurring theme in the Court's case-law is the notion of 
human dignity which lies at the heart of many of the Convention 
guarantees. So the Court held last year in Kalashnikov v. Russia 
that a State must ensure that a person is detained in prison in 
conditions which are compatible with respect for his human 
236 Benjamin and Wilson v. the United Kingdom, 26.9.2002. 
237 Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukaine, 25.7.2002. 
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dignity. The manner and execution of the measure should not 
subject him to distress and hardship of an intensity exceeding the 
unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention. Moreover the 
absence of any positive intention to humiliate or debase the 
detainee, although a factor to be taken into account, could not 
exclude a finding of inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited 
by Article 3 of the Convention238 . 
Human dignity was at issue in other cases in 2002. Early in the 
year a Chamber of the Court had a particularly poignant case to 
decide in which human dignity was in issue.239 The applicant, Mrs 
Pretty, a British national in the terminal stages of motor neurone 
disease, had sought an undertaking from the Director of Public 
Prosecutions that her husband would not be prosecuted if he 
assisted her to commit suicide. The applicant claimed that this 
refusal infringed, among other things, her right to life under Article 
2 of the Convention, the prohibition of inhuman or degrading 
treatment under Article 3 and the right to respect for private life 
under Article 8. 
The Court was not persuaded that "the right to life" guaranteed in 
Article 2 could be interpreted as involving a negative aspect. 
Article 2 was, the Court held, unconcerned with issues to do with 
the quality of living or what a person chose to do with his or her 
life. Article 2 could not, without a distortion of language, be 
interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a 
right to die; nor could it create a right to self-determination in the 
sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death 
rather than life. 
The Court accordingly found that no right to die, whether at the 
hands of a third person or with the assistance of a public authority, 
could be derived from Article 2 of the Convention. 
238 Kalashnikov v. Russia, 15.7.2002. 
239 Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 29.4.2002, ECHR 2002, § 38. 
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Looking at Article 3 the Court considered that it could be described 
in general terms as imposing a primarily negative obligation on 
States to refrain from inflicting serious harm on persons within 
their jurisdiction. However, in light of the fundamental importance 
of Article 3, the Court has reserved to itself sufficient flexibility to 
address the application of that Article in other situations that might 
arise. Thus for example the suffering which flowed from naturally 
occurring illness, physical or mental, might be covered by Article 
3, where it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, whether 
flowing from -conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, 
for which the authorities can be held responsible240• 
In the case before the Court, it was beyond dispute that the 
respondent Government had not, themselves, inflicted any ill­
treatment on the applicant. Nor was there any complaint that the 
applicant was not receiving adequate care from the State medical 
authorities. The applicant claimed rather that the refusal of the 
authorities to give an undertaking not to prosecute her husband 
disclosed inhuman and degrading treatment for which the State was 
responsible. This sought to place a new and extended construction 
on the concept of treatment, which went beyond the ordinary 
meaning of the word. Article 3 had to be construed in harmony 
with Article 2, which hitherto had been associated with it as 
reflecting basic values respected by democratic societies. As the 
Court had already held, Article 2 of the Convention was first and 
foremost a prohibition on the use of lethal force or other conduct 
which might lead to the death of a human being and did not confer 
any claim on an individual to require a State to permit or facilitate 
his or her death. The positive obligation on the part of the State 
which was invoked would require that the State sanction actions 
intended to terminate life, an obligation that could not be derived 
from Article 3 of the Convention. 
The Court nevertheless noted, in its consideration of the complaint 
under Article 8, that the very essence of the Convention was 
respect for human dignity and human freedom. In an era of 
240 See for example D. v. the United Kingdom, 2.5.1997, Reports 1997-III. 
- 143 -
An Address Relating to the European Convention On Human Rights 
growing medical sophistication combined with longer life 
expectancies, many people were concerned that they should not be 
forced to linger on in old age or in states of advanced physical or 
mental decrepitude which conflicted with strongly held ideas of 
self and personal identity. The Court· was not prepared to exclude 
that the circumstances of the case could give rise to an interference 
with the right to respect for private life. 
This meant that that under the second paragraph of Article 8 the 
Court had to determine the necessity of such interference. It found 
that States were entitled to regulate through the operation of the 
general criminal law activities which were detrimental to the life 
and safety of other individuals The law in issue was designed to 
safeguard life by protecting the weak and vulnerable and especially 
those who were not in a condition to take informed decisions 
against acts intended to end life or to assist in ending life. It was 
primarily for States to assess the risk and the likely incidence of 
abuse if the general prohibition on assisted suicides were relaxed or 
if exceptions were to be created. The contested measure could be 
justified as "necessary in a democratic society". 
This sensitive and difficult case provides a further example of the 
Court's cautious approach to the living instrument doctrine in areas 
which are still the matter of intense legal, moral and scientific 
debate. It also reminds us that there are areas of action within 
which States must retain a degree of discretion both as the local 
authorities best placed to carry out certain assessments and also in 
accordance with the principles of a democratic society. 
Dignity in the context of personal autonomy also played a part in 
the Court's reasoning in the British transsexual case, Christine 
Goodwin, to which I have already referred. In that case the Court 
repeated its statement that respect for human dignity and human 
freedom was the very essence of the Convention. Protection was 
given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right 
to establish details of their identity as individual human beings. 
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I have concentrated briefly on three aspects of the Court's case­
load in 2002, evolutive interpretation, separation of powers and 
human dignity. It goes without saying that this is a mere glimpse of 
the Court's recent activity, even if the themes are recurring and 
fundamental ones. The sheer volume of the Court's case-load 
brings with it its own problems. 
This brings me to some figures. The Court has currently some 30,000 
applications pending before its decision bodies. An audit carried out 
in 2001 by the Council of Europe futemal Auditor predicted over 
20,000 applications annually by 2005. Our own figures suggest an 
even steeper rise. fu 2001 we registered some 14,000 applications. 
Applications have increased by around 130% since the present Court 
took office in November 1998, by about 1,400% since 1988. The 
potential for growth is almost unlimited as a result of the expansion of 
the Council of Europe over the last decade and this situation will be 
compounded when new member States ratify. Moreover, the 
evolution of case-load is not merely quantitative. The nature of the 
cases coming before the Court inevitably reflects the changed 
composition of the Council of Europe with a significant number of 
States which are still in many respects, and particularly with regard to 
their judicial systems, in transition, even if considerable progress has 
been made in some of them. In such States there are likely to be 
structural problems, which cannot be resolved overnight. 
I am now more than ever convinced that, only just over four years 
after the radical reform of the Convention mechanism implemented 
by Protocol No. 11, replacing the two original institutions by a single 
judicial body, the system is in further need of a major overhaul. 
That is why we should now be looking for a mechanism not only 
for the expeditious and cheap disposal of applications which do not 
satisfy the admissibility requirements, but also to relieve the Court 
of routine, manifestly well-founded cases and indeed beyond that 
cases which do not raise an issue in the sense that the issue of 
principle has already been resolved. If the obligation for a 
respondent State arising from a finding of a violation of the 
Convention is the elimination of the causes of the violation to 
- 145 -
An Address Relating to the European Convention On Human Rights 
prevent its repetition, then subsequent applications whose 
complaint derives from the same circumstances should be seen as 
problem of execution. This is particularly true of violations of a 
"structural" nature241• 
Once the Court has established the existence of a structural 
violation or an administrative practice, is the general purpose of 
raising the level of human rights protection in the State concerned 
really served by continuing to issue judgments establishing the 
same violation?. Here we see the conflict between general interest 
and individual relief at its clearest. If individual relief is the 
primary objective of the Convention system then of course in the 
situation described the Court must continue to give judgments so as 
to be able to award compensation to the individual victim. Yet if 
we look at the scheme for just satisfaction set up by the Convention 
under Article 41, we can see that it hardly supports the individual 
relief theory. To begin with it is discretionary as the Court is to 
award satisfaction "if necessary". The Court's case-law shows that 
it is indeed not the automatic consequence of a finding of violation. 
Hence the Court's well-established practice of holding in 
appropriate cases that a finding of a violation is in itself sufficient 
just satisfaction242• This is surely also an indication of the "public­
policy" nature of the system. 
But let us take a concrete example. The Court found as I have said 
a violation of Article 3 prohibiting inhuman and degrading 
treatment in respect of prison conditions in Russia and the evidence 
adduced by the Government itself indicated that this was a 
widespread situation throughout the State concerned. It has to be 
asked whether there would be a great deal of sense in the Court's 
processing the potentially tens of thousands of applications brought 
by detainees in similar conditions? Would the award of the no 
doubt quite substantial compensation on an individual basis, always 
supposing that the Court was able to deal with the cases concerned, 
hasten the resolution of the problem, contribute to the elimination 
241 See Botazzi v. Italy, 28.7.1999, ECHR 1999-V. 
242 The first time this formula was used was in Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21.2.1975, 
Series A no. 1975. 
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of the causes of the original violation? Very probably not and 
particularly if it is considered that one of the causes may well be a 
lack of funding. At the same time it would undermine the 
credibility of the Court for it to continue to issue findings of 
violations with no apparent effect. 
The inflow of thousands of same issue cases would clog up the 
system almost irremediably. This might lead to judgments 
delivered five, six years or more after the lodging of the 
application. Not only is this sort of delay unacceptable, it also 
complicates the execution process because Governments can claim 
that the situation represented in the judgment no longer reflects the 
reality. I cite prison conditions, but the same problem could, indeed 
undoubtedly will, arise in relation to structural dysfunction in the 
operation of legal systems in some contracting States. We have 
already a foretaste of this with length of proceedings in Italy. We 
now realise that about half the Contracting States have problems 
with the length of judicial proceedings; we also know that there are 
in many of them grave difficulties with regard to the non-execution 
of final and binding judicial decisions. 
It does therefore seem to me that the way forward is to make it 
possible for the Court to concentrate its efforts on decisions of 
"principle", decisions which create jurisprudence. This would also 
be the best means of ensuring that the common minimum standards 
are maintained across Europe. The lowering of standards is often 
cited in European Union circles as a potential consequence of the 
enlargement of the Council of Europe. Examination of the cases 
decided over the last three years belies this fear. Yet there is a risk 
in the longer term, a risk that can be avoided if the Court adheres to 
a more "constitutional" role as I have advocated. 
With many thousands of applications being brought annually the 
right of individual application will in practice be in any event 
seriously circumscribed by the material impossibility of processing 
them in anything like a reasonable time. Will we really be able to 
claim that with say 30,000 cases a year, full, effective access can be 
guaranteed? Is it not better to take a more realistic approach to the 
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problem and preserve the essence of the system, in conformity with 
its fundamental objective, with the individual application being 
seen as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, as the 
magnifying glass which reveals the imperfections in national legal 
systems, as the thermometer which tests the democratic 
temperature of the States? Is it not better for there to be far fewer 
judgments, but promptly delivered and extensively reasoned ones 
which establish the jurisprudential principles with a compelling 
clarity that will render them de facto binding erga omnes, while at 
the same time revealing the structural problems which undermine 
democracy and the rule of law in parts of Europe? 
This brings me back to my opening comment about the fundamental 
goal of the Convention system. That system will never provide an 
adequate substitute for effective human rights protection at national 
level; it has to be complementary to such protection. It should 
come into play where the national protection breaks down, but it 
cannot wholly replace national protection or even one area of 
national protection. Apart form anything else, although the 
Convention is about individuals, it is not only about the tiny 
proportion of individuals who bring their cases to Strasbourg, and it 
will never be more than a tiny proportion. 
As long as we remain too wedded to the idea of purely individual 
justice, we actually make it more difficult for the system to protect 
a greater number. At the same time I keep in my mind two images 
from last year: a dying woman in a wheelchair whose first and last 
trip abroad was to the hearing of her case in Strasbourg, whose own 
dignity and courage provoked universal admiration. The second 
image was also that of a woman, but one who had been born a man 
and whose suffering over many years although on a different level 
it is difficult for most of us to imagine. She came, with her adult 
children, to the public delivery of the Court's judgment and again 
impressed by her quiet dignity and apparent serenity. 
Luzius Wildhaber 
16 January 2003 
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